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"A House Divided:
Party Polarization on Welfare Issues"
1996

Amy Stewart
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, the general pUblic and the media have paid
much attention to the perceived polarization on welfare
issues.

As Everett Carll Ladd (1995) illustrates in Figure

1, 3/4 of his sample of the general population agreed on the
role of government in welfare in 1988.

However, this

consensus had disintegrated into a near polar split by 1994.

Assessing Welfare Programs

\

Question: Do you agree or disagree...• "It is the r.esponsibility ·or the government to take care or
people who can't take care of themselves?"
•
agree
disagree
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Source: Surveys by Princeton Survey Res=h Associates for the Times Mirror Center latest that of July p.??
1994.
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E~~rett Carll Ladd, ~~he 1994 Congressional Elections:
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continues," p.12.
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Because the U.S. House of Representatives is supposedly most
responsive to popular opinion, the research here
investigates possible determinants of this trend as
manifested by our Representatives in the House.

This

research postulates that not only divided government and the
decline of the conservative coalition, but also the Contract
with America contribute to the causation of party unity, and
Ultimately to the causation of party polarization on welfare

\
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issues.

Consequently, this research reveals that the

conservative coalition did not decline, that the unity of
both parties did increase after the Contract With America,
and that the Democrats remain consistently more unified than
the Republicans despite the perception that Republicans are
more unified as a result of their Contract With America.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Much of the current literature implies that divided
government and the decline of conservative coalition votes
are correlated with an increase in party polarization on
welfare votes in the House.

Divided government has

characterized American politics during much of the last

2~

decades (1968-1~92), with the executive traditionally
dominated by Republicans and the House by Democrats.

Morris

P. Fiorina (1991) illustrates that this trend is
demonstrated not only at the federal level, but also at the
state level.

Due to this divided government, both parties

work to strengthen their party unity so that they are better
able to battle their feirce opposition.

For instance, in

the 1970s, the Democrats revised the procedure by which
their Caucus elected committee chairs, thus holding their
leaders accountable to the entire party membership and
enforcing party unity.

The Republicans have since responded

with resolve to tighten their ranks.

As the parties become

more unified and galvanized, they leave little room for
compromise or moderate positions.
polarized.

In effect, they become
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As party unity increases, the frequency of conservative
coalition votes may be expected to decline because
conservative Southern Democrats who used to vote with
Republicans against Northern Democrats beginning in the
1930s and 1940s, now either vote liberally with their own
party or convert to the Republican party (Cooper and Brady,
p.423).

Some contend that the decline of conservative

coalition votes is also attributable to the 1965 voting
Rights Act which enabled larger numbers of black voters to
reach the polls, thus making Southern Representatives more
accountable to the traditionally liberal segments of their
constituencies.

But, Fleisher (1993) finds that even when

controlling for such constituency variables like increased
percentage of black liberal voters, the Americans for
Democratic Action (ADA) and party unity scores of Northern
Democrats still rise.

Table 1 demonstrates this trend from

M;.'\.N ADA AND P~ry U~ITYSUPPottr'SCORES NOR.THaRN AND SOUTHERN
DEMOCRATS

1981-1987

.\

.

Richard Fleisher, "~xplaininq thQ Change in Roll-Call 'voting Behavior
of Southern D~mocrats,n p.332."
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1981 to 1987.

While ADA and party unity scores for Southern

Democrats increased approximately 30 and 23 points
respectively, Northern Democrats increased about 10 points
on each set of scores.

This emphasizes the fact that

Northern Democrats who were largely unaffected by the
increase in liberal black voters still became more liberal
for reasons other than the 1965 voting Rights Act.
Table 2 illustrates this partisan galvanization in both
parties.

As Bond and Fleisher (1995) demonstrate, since the

Johnson administration in the 1960s, the extremely partisan
factions of both parties have increased approximately 30
Size of the Party Factions, First~Year Majority Presidents
Pr~sid~n!

Table 2

Housc
Eiscnhower
Kenncdy
Johnson
C:JItcr
Qinlon
Senale
Eiscnhower
Kennedy
Johnson
Cutcr
Reagan
Clinlon

Pusid~nJ's

Cross·Pressur~d

Cross·Pnssurrd

Bas~

Opposition

Partisans

Oppon~nts

Bas~

201
188
203
223
222

19
74
91

43
31
19
21
5

170
143
121
124
li3

36
42
51

12
22
16
18
10
7

44

43
50

66

36

13

35

11

25

4

29
26
34
40

12
13
3

\

Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, "Clinton_ and Congress:
Year Asse.ssment," p. 363 ~
points, while the two cross-pressured or moderate factions
have substantially decreased.
"cross-pressured"

For these purposes,

factions represent those groups who have

conflicting and thus less polarized positions on issues
studied.

Rebecca C. Morton (1993) contends that this

polarization is even more likely when Representatives have

A First
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incomplete information regarding voter policy preferences.
Because of this party polarization, Agae Clausen argues that
now "Party is the best single predictor of voting",
especially on welfare issues (Clausen, p.275).

THEORETICAL LOGIC
Many authors agree with Clausen that welfare produces
the greatest level of party polarization.

Indeed, Bond and

Fleisher (1995) find that when Congress voted on domestic
issues such as welfare in 1993, Democrats supported the
liberal position 54% of the time -- twice that of the
Republicans.

In other areas, Democrats and Republicans are

more likely to support a moderate position, thus indicating
a decrease in party unity and therefore party polarization
as issues become less domestic.

Because the positions of

Republicans and Democrats are so divergent on welfare
issues, their votes on such issues will probably be more
partisan and polarized.

Therefore, divided government and

the decline of the conservative coalition may exacerbate
party polarization on welfare votes in the House.
The Contract With America is a product of the
Republican party which represents the cUlmination of divided
government.

It not only synthesized the Republican agenda

and promoted party organization, but its portrayal as a
unifying force intimidated Democrats.

Ladd (1995) notes

that, although the Contract with America includes mostly
Rules changes for House procedure, it created the perception
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that Republicans are unified conservatively on every front,
including welfare.

This was accomplished by focusing the

chaos of the 1994 Republican House takeover into a scheduled
legislative agenda.

The Contract with America publicized

the Republicans' position on many issues, and House Speaker
Newt Gingrich successfully brought these issues to a floor
vote, as promised.

This organization was especially

impressive considering that Republicans had not been in
positions of chamber leadership for many decades, and that
32% of their party were freshmen (Ornstein and Schenkenberg,
p.187).

Due to the importance of the Contract With America

and its role in the Republican takeover, this study
investigates the years immediately before and after that
event.
The success of this type of initiative by the
Republican leadership reflects high party unity.

Indeed,

according to Cooper and Brady (1981), the "impact of
institutional context on leadership behavior is primarily
determined by party strength".

The Contract With America

highlights this progressing trend in the House of increasing
party unity.

According to Charles

o.

Jones (1968), the

Republicans attained success in this endeavor precisely
because they parlayed their electoral majority into a
procedural majority or "those necessary to organize the
House for business" as well as a substantive majority or
"those necessary to pass legislation".
Ornstein and Schenkenberg (1995) further point out that
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the Republicans' small majority of 230 require them to
maintain cohesiveness in order to fUlfill the agenda
promised in the Contract With America.

Jones'

(1968)

description of Cannon's Speakership in the early 1900s also
applies to the mentality required to sustain the high degree
of partisanship today:

"Those members who reject the party

leadership are rejecting the Republican party and its
mandate from the people to manage the House and its work".
This trend of ever-tightening party unity resembles that of
an arms race, with each side attempting to out-do the other
until eventually they galvanize into diametric opposition
with no room for moderate positions.

Therefore, divided

government and increased party unity cUlminating in the
Contract With America may lead to increased party
polarization on welfare votes.
However, these national-level explanations for
increased party polarization such as divided government,
conservative coalition decline, and the Contract With
America may miss the broader picture.

Fiorina (1991) points

this out when he contends that "trends in state elections
parallel to those in national elections raise suspicions
that more general forces are at work and that existing
explanations of divided government may be too
level-specific".

National-level explanations in the

American context also fail to account for party polarization
more genreally.

For instance if divided national government

causes polarization, then why does polarization occur in
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parliamentary systems such as England where divided
government cannot occur?

This research acknowledges that

fact and therefore merely attempts to identify possible
causal factors at the national level only.

METHODOLOGY
This study is covers the 103rd and 104th Congresses
which come directly before and after the Republican takeover
of the House and the Contract with America.

For, if

polarization were ever to occur, it would be at this
juncture.

The unit of analysis is individual House members,

and the type of data used are House roll-call votes from
1993 to 1995.

For the purposes of this study, welfare votes

consist of partisan votes on issues like hunger,
homelessness, Health and Human Services, as well as
entitlements including Women, Infants, and Children (WIC),
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Supplemental
Security Income, Medicare, and Medicaid.

But they do not

include abortion, veteran's benefits, Housing and Urban
Development, or procedural votes.
Procedural votes do not always reflect the actual
conservative or liberal position of the House member.

For

instance, a Democrat may be in favor of a lioeral welfare
bill, but if the Republican Rules Committee members impose
restricting debate and amending procedures, then the
Democrat will be forced to vote against the bill.

It

appears, then, that the Democrat has voted against the
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liberal welfare bill when in actuality she has voted against
the conservative Rules parameters.
Three votes were chosen for each year of the study,
culminating in a total of six votes for the 103rd Congress
and three votes for the 104th Congress.

Those for the 103rd

Congress are as follows:
1993 HR920:
HR2518:
HR3167:
1994 HR4606:
HR8:
HR4604:

exempting unemployment compensation extensions
from pay-as-you-go restrictions
appropriating funds for Health and Human
Services
extending unemployment services
appropriating funds for Health and Human
Services
re-authorizing WIC, school lunch, and other
nutrition programs until 1998
establishing procedures for controlling
entitlement expenditures

Unfortunately, HR4606 and HR8 were ultimately dropped from
the study because a majority of Democrats voted with a
majority of Republicans, therefore violating the
requirements of a party unity vote.
of 4 votes for the 103rd Congress.

This results in a total
Those votes selected

from the 104th Congress are as follows:
1995 HR4:
overhauling the welfare program
HR1976: capping participation in the WIC program
HR4604: establishing procedures for controlling
entitlement expenditures
The Representatives' positions on these votes are recorded
in SPSS along with their party and region.

Every liberal

vote is scored as a 1 and every conservative vote is scored
as a 0, thus establishing a welfare index.

If a

representative voted liberally on every issue in the 103rd
Congress, she receives a score of 4 because the maximum
liberal score is 4.0 for the 103rd Congress and 3.0 for the
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104th Congress.

The most conservative score for both

Congresses is 0.0.

DATA ANALYSIS
In the 103rd Congress, conservative coalition levels
were very low.

Congressional Quarterly reports that for the

House alone, the conservative coalition existed on only 44
out of 597 votes in 1993 and 36 out of 497 in 1994 to equal
only 7% appearance (Almanac of 1994, p.6-C).
As demonstrated by the following tables, the level of
party polarization was as high as the conservative coalition
scores were low.

Table 3 shows that votes on HR920 resulted

in 91.1% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing 84.4% of
HR920
Conservative
Unemployment
vote
Table 3 Liberal
Unemployment
Vote

I Republican I Democrat I Total
I
I
I 163
84.4%
8.9%
I
I 39.3%
I
I
I
I
I
I
I 252
15.6%
91.1% I 60.7%
I
I
I
I
I
167
248
I 415
I
I
40.2%
59.8%
I
I
I 100%

Total
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V)

=

.75, Significant at .01

Republicans voting conservatively.

More Republicans than

Democrats defected.

Table 4 shows a similar pattern for

HR2518
Conservative
HHS Approp.
Vote
Table 4 Liberal
HHS Approp.
Vote

I Republican I Democrat I Total
I
I
I 123
62.1%
7.0%
I
I
I 28.9%
I
I
I
I
I
I 302
37.9%
93.0%
I
I 71.1%
I
I
I
I
169
256
I
I
I 425
39.8%
60.2% I 100%
I
I

Total
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V)

=

.59, Significant at .01
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HR2518 with 93% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing
only 2/3 of Republicans who voted conservatively.

Likewise

in Table 5, HR3167 saw' 92.8% of Democrats voting liberally
and opposing only about half of Republicans voting
HR3167
/ Republican / Democrat / Total
Conservative /
/
/ 96
Unemploy. ext/
7.2%
50.3%
/
/ 24.4%
Vote
/
/
/
Table 5 Liberal
/ 297
/
/
Unemploy. ext/
49.7%
92.8% / 75.6%
/
Vote
/
/
/
157
236
/
/ 393
/
Total
39.9%
60.0% / 100%
/
/
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V) = .49, Significant at .01
conservatively.

Table 6 illustrates the same thing for

1994: 94.4% of Democrats voted liberally and again opposed
about half of Republicans who voted conservatively.

These

findings show that party unity for Democrats was very high,
usually approximating a 9 to 1 ratio of party supporters to
party defectors.

However, Republicans were not as unified,

HR4604
Conservative
Entitlement
Vote
Table 6 Liberal
Entitlement
Vote

/ Republican / Democrat / Total
/
/
/ 107
55.7%
5.6%
/
/
/ 25.5%
/
/
/
/
/
/ 312
44.3%
94.4% / 74.5%
/
/
/
/
/
167
252
/
/ 419
/
39.9%
60.1% / 100%
/
/

Total
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V) = .56, Significant at .01
with their highest ratio approximating 8 to 2 and falling as
low as 1 to 1.

Thus, Democrats demonstrated much greater

party unity, even though Republicans were unified at least
50% of the time.

Finally, the indices for the 103rd
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Congress are displayed in Table 7.

The number of Democrats

who always voted liberally was nearly

3~

times greater than

the number of Republicans who always voted conservatively.
But, the two most conservative categories only equal 23.9%
while the two most liberal categories equal 66.4%.

All of

these tables are statistically significant at the .01 level.
Index
0.00
1.00
Table 7 2.00
3.00
4.00

/ Republican / Democrat / Total
28.2%
0.0%
/
/
/ 11.3% 42
30.2%
0.9%
/
/
/ 12.6% 47
18.8%
3.6%
36
/
/
/ 9.7%
15.4%
18.8% / 17.5% 65
/
/
7.4%
76.7% / 48.9% 182
/
/
149
223
/
/
/
Total /
40.1%
59.9% / 100% 372
/
Significance = .0166.4%.
As of 25 November 1995, the conservative coalition
existed on 102 out of 821 House votes for the 104th
Congress, or 12.4%.

This is obviously higher than the 7%

for the 103rd Congress.

Even though these figures

contradict the theoretical logic by showing an increase
rather than a decrease in the appearance of the conservative
coalition thus far, the 104th Congress still demonstrates
more

part~

polarization than that of the 103rd Congress.

HR1976
Conservative
WIC Cap
Vote
Liberal
WIC Cap
Vote

/ Republican
/
64.3%
/
/
Table 8
/
35.7%
/
/
227
/
53.7%
Total
/
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V) =

/ Democrat / Total
/
/ 147
0.5%
/
/ 34.8%
/
/
/
/ 276
99.5% / 65.2%
/
/
/
196
/
/ 423
46.3% / 100%
/
.66, Significant at .01
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The results for HR1976 in Table 8 echo those of the
103rd Congress with 99.5% of Democrats voting liberally and
opposing only 64.3% of Republican who voted conservatively.
Virtually no Democrats, but nearly a third of Republicans
defected.

But, for HR4 in Table 9, 95.5% of Democrats voted

liberally and opposed 96.6% of Republicans who voted
conservatively.

Table 9

HR2425 in Table 10 is also highly polarized

HR4
Conservative
Welfare
Vote
Liberal
Welfare
Vote

I Republican I Democrat I Total
234
I
I
I
96.6%
4.5%
I
I
I 54%
I
I
I
I
I
I 199
3.4%
95.5% I 46%
I
I
I
I
I
233
200
I
I 433
I
53.6%
46.2%
I
I
I 100%

Total
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V)

I

=

.92, Significant at .01

with 97.5% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing 97% of
Republicans voting conservatively.

Finally, the indices for

HR2425
I Republican I Democrat I Total
Conservative I
I
I 231
Medicare
97%
2.5%
I
I 53.5%
I
Vote
I
I
I
Table 10 Liberal
I
I 201
I
Medicare
97.5% I 46.5%
3%
I
I
Vote
I
I
I
233
199
I
I 432
I
Total
53.9%
46.1% I 100%
I
I
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V) = .94, Significant at .01
the 104th Congress are located in Table 11.

A far greater

percentage of Republicans were strictly conservative than in
the 103rd Congress with 61.7% voting conservatively here.
Democrats remained high in the strictly liberal category
with 93.8%.

However, this time the scales are more
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polarized with 53% in the two most conservative categories
and 47% in the two most liberal categories.

Clearly, these

votes are not necessarily representative of all votes, but

Index / Republican / Democrat / Total
/
/
/ 140
0.00 /
61.7%
0.0%
/
/ 33.4%
/
/ 82
/
1.00 /
35.2%
1. 0%
/
/ 19.6%
/
/
/ 16
2.6%
5.2%
Table 11 2.00 /
/ 3.8%
/
/
/ 181
/
3.00 /
0.4%
93.8% / 43.2%
/
192
227
/ 419
/
/
45.8% / 100%
Total /
54.2%
/
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V) = .96, Significant at .01
they are consistent with the Congressional Quarterly's
General Report and its statistics on party unity and
partisanship for the first session of the 104th Congress.
The conservative coalition scores do not concur with
the theoretical logic.

To date, the scores have risen

approximately five points in the House from the 103rd to the
104th Congresses.

Even though this time frame is only a

snapshot of the long-term trend of polarization, the data
here shows that increased party polarization is not
necessarily determined by a decrease in conservative
coalition votes.

However, this increase in conservative

coalition votes may be due to the fact that it measures all
conservative coalition votes, not just those on welfare
issues as studied here.

Despite these findings, other

components of the theoretical logic have not been
discredited.

In fact, party unity on these welfare votes
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increased after the Contract with America and the Republican
takeover of the House.

The Democrats maintain a higher

degree of party unity than Republicans on these welfare
votes both in the 103rd Congress when they held the majority
as well as in the 104th Congress when they were in the
minority.

They consistently had approximately 90% party

unity and very few defectors.

This is underscored by the

heavily-weighted liberal indices for Democrats in both
Congresses.
The Republicans became more unified in the 104th
Congress when they held the majority as compared to their
divisiveness in the 103rd Congress when in the minority.
Their party unity rose from nearly 50% in the 103rd Congress
to reach above 90% for two out of the three votes in the
104th Congress.

They were never as heavily weighted toward

conservatism as Democrats were toward liberalism on the
welfare indices.

But, because both parties became more

unified, they left little room for moderate positions or
compromise, thus increasing party polarization.
A regional analysis of the data reveals a similar
pattern.

Table 12 in the Appendix indicates that all

regions were weighted toward the liberal end of the index,
but the Northeast and East regions had the highest liberal
to conservative index ratio with the two most liberal and
the two most conservative categories equalling approximately
8:2.

Conversely, the Midwest showed the most conservative

index for the 103rd Congress with an approximate 1:1 ratio.
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The Southwest and East were ultimately dropped from the
individual regional analysis due to their low sample size.
In the individual regional examination, Table 13
reveals that in the South, Republicans were split with the
two most liberal categories equalling 14.6% and the two most
conservative equalling 65.9%, but the Democrats were a
little more galvanized with the liberal categories totaling
71.5% and conservative totaling 2.9%.

The West is a bit

more unified for Republicans with the liberal faction
totaling 10% and the conservative end of the index equalling
79%.

Democrats are again very unified with all votes in the

two most liberal index categories.

The Northeast, displayed

in Table 15, again shows more unity by Democrats than
Republicans with all Democrats in most" liberal categories
and even Republicans weighted toward the liberal end of the
index.

Finally, Table 16 shows great polarization in the

Midwest with 65% of Republicans in the two most conservative
categories and all Democrats in the most liberal categories.
All of these cross-tabulations are statistically significant
at the .01 level.
Tables 17 through 21 display the regional findings for
the 104th Congress.

The overall regional analysis indicates

more polarization than in the 103rd Congress:

this time,

the Northeast and East are liberally-dominated, the West is
split down the middle, and the South and Southwest are
conservatively-dominated.

Once again, the Southwest and

East are dropped from the individual examination due to
their low sample size.
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The remaining regions show higher party polarization
than those of the 103rd Congress, supporting the theoretical
logic that party polarization may be determined by divided
government and the Contract with America.

Table 18 shows

the complete unity of Southern Republicans with all in the
two most conservative index categories.

Unusually, this

time Democrats are the least unified with all but 3.3% in
the two most liberal categories.

Table 19 indicates the

polarization of the West with almost all Republicans in the
two most conservative categories and all Democrats in the
two most liberal categories.

In the Northeast in Table 20,

all Democrats were once again in the two most liberal
categories, while the Republicans had only 88.9% in the two
most conservative categories.

Finally, in the Midwest,

Table 21 indicates another complete polar split.

Thus, the

parties are more united by region as a whole and as
individual areas like the South, West, Northeast, and
Midwest.

The Democrats are unified in every region for both

Congresses, and the Republicans show a marked increase in
unity, moving from moderate splits in the 103rd Congress to
near absolute unity in all regions for the 104th Congress,
thus augmenting party polarization on welfare issues.

CONCLUSION
The degree of partisanship demonstrated by the House
after the Contract With America does increase despite the
fact that conservative coalition scores increase rather than
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decrease as expected.

But, even though divided government

and the Contract With America may determine party
galvanization, Republicans do not show the same degree of
partisanship on these welfare votes as Democrats either by
region or as a whole.

This contradicts the perception that

the Republican party is a disciplined juggernaught that
remains unified under all circumstances.

Apparently, the

perception that the Contract with America is the ultimate
unifying force for the ultimately unified party is mistaken.
For, it is the Democrats, and not the Republicans who show
the most cohesiveness in these particular instances.

FUTURE EXPANSION
This research design can be expanded in at least two
directions.

It could test the theory forwarded by Robert S.

Erikson and Gerald C. Wright in "Voters, Candidates, and
Issues In Congressional Elections" that the most moderate
Representatives corne from the most marginal districts and
the most extreme Representatives corne from the safest
districts.

In accordance with that theory, the design could

investigate whether or not the Representatives from the most
marginal districts have the most moderate positions on
welfare issues, and the Representatives with the greatest
chance of getting re-elected easily have the most extreme
positions on such issues.

Another option is to expand this

longitudinal study laterally to compare the votes of
Representatives on foreign policy and budget issues to those
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on welfare for the 103rd and 104th Congresses to see if
welfare yates truly are more polarized than other types of
yates.
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APPENDIX
103rd Congress
Index/South/Southwest/West/Northeast/Midwest/East/Total
0.0 /13.5%/ 14.3% /9.2% / 3.7%
/ 17.4% /9.1% /11.3% 42
1.0 /12.6%/ 0%
/22.4%/ 6.2%
/ 12.8% /0%
/12.6% 47
2.0 /10.8%/ 14.3% /3.9% / 7.4%
/ 15.1% /9.1% /9.7% 36
3.0 /22.5%/ 14.3% /18.4%/ 19.8% /
7%
/27.3%/17.5% 65
4.0 /40.5%/ 57.1
/46.1%/ 63%
/ 47.7% /54.5%/48.9%182
Total/29.8%/ 1.9%
/20.4%/ 21.8% / 23.1% /
3% /100%
111
7
76
81
86
11 372
Pearson's

= 37.636,

Cramer's V

=

.15904, Significance

=

.01

Table 13 -7I=n,,=,d=e=xL..;/=R7e~pu=b~l~i=-c;:;.;a=n=/-:-=D;;..;:e~m:;.:o:..:c:.=r:..::a:..:t:.L./,...:T~o:..::t~a:.=l,,- Pearson = 70.82
South
0.0 / 36.6%
/ 0%
/13.5% 15 Cramer'sV = .79
1.0 / 29.3%
/ 2.9%
/12.6% 14 Sig. = .01
2.0 / 19.5%
/ 5.7%
/10.8% 12
3.0 / 12.2%
/ 28.6% /22.5% 25
4.0 / 2.4%
/ 62.9% /40.5% 45
Total/ 36.9%
/ 63.1% /100%
41
70
111
Pearson = 64.759
Table 14 Index/Republican/Democrat/Total
Cramer'sV
= .923
0.0 /23.3%
/ 0%
/9.2%
7
West
Sig.
=
.01
1.0 /56.7%
/ 0%
/22.4% 17
2.0 /10%
/ 0%
/3.9%
3
3.0 /6.7%
/ 26.1% /18.4% 14
4.0% /3.3%
/ 73.9% /46.1% 35
Total/39.5%
/ 60.5% /100%
30
46
76
Table 15 Index/Republican/Democrat/Total
Pearson = 41.346
NortheastO.O / 9.4%
/ 0%
/3.7%
3 Cramer'sV = .714
1.0 / 15.6%
/ 0%
/6.2%
5 Sig. = .01
2.0 / 18.8%
/ 0%
/7.4%
6
3.0 / 34.4%
/ 10.2% /19.8% 16
4.0 / 21.9%
/ 89.8% /63%
51
Total/ 39.5%
/ 60.5% /100%
32
49
81
Table 16 Index/Republican/Democrat/Total
Pearson = 66.773
Midwest 0.0 / 37.5%
/ 0%
/17.4% 15 Cramer'sV = .881
1.0 / 27.5%
/ 0%
/12.8% 11 Sig. = .01
2.0 / 25%
/ 6.5%
/15.1% 13
3.0 / 7.5%
/ 6.5%
/7%
6
4.0 / 2.5%
/ 87%
/47.7% 41
Total/ 46.5%
/ 53.5% /100%
40
46
86
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APPENDIX
104th Congress
Index/South/southwest/West/Northeast/Midwest IEast/Total

Pearson's

= 24.430,

Cramer's V

=

.13941, Significance

Table 18 Index/Republican/Democrat/Total
0.0 I 70.3%
138.8%
South
I 0%
1.0 I 29.7%
I 3.3% 117.9%
2.0 I 0%
I 8.3% 13.7%
3.0 I 0%
I 88.3% 139.6%
Totall 55.2%
I 44.8% 1100%
74
134
60

=

.01

Pearson = 126
52 Cramer'sV =.97
24 Sig. = .01
5
53

Table 19 Index/Republican/nemocrat/Total
Pearson = 72.9
West
0.0 I 75%
I 0%
140%
30 Cramer'sV = .9
I -=O%=--_----<.1.,...=1:..:2:..<.::%:.....-_----=-0 S i g. = • 0 1
..:.1...:..•..=. 0---J/"":--'2=-=2::....:.:....::5:...<.:%:.....-_L.:
2.0 I 2.5%
I 2.9%
12.7%
2
3.0 I 0%
I 97.1% 145.3%
34
Totall 53.3%
I 46.7% 1100%
40
35
75
Table 20 Index/Republican/nemocrat/Total
Pearson = 84.7
NortheastO.O I 37.8%
I 0%
118.1%
17 Cramer'sV = .9
. ::.1.•.:. . =. 0---J/"":--'5::..,:1:..;.;..:1:...<.:%:.....-_L.:1_0=%=--_----<.1.,...=2:....:4:..:.•..=.5=%_ _2=-=..3 S i g. = • 0 1
2.0 I 8.9%
I 4.1%
16.4%
6
3.0 I 2.2%
I 95.9% 151.1%
48
Totall 47.9%
I 52.1% 1100%
45
49
94
Table 21 Index/Republican/Democrat/Total
Midwest 0.0 I 58.9%
I 0%
134.4%

Pearson = 96
33 Cramer'sV = 1
-=-1...:...-=-0---J/'-:-4~1=:-'.:....:1:..:.;%:.....--L.:/~O%'"7------<./':-':2;...:4=%'--:--__=_=_2 3 S i g. = • 0 1
2.0 I 0%
I 5%
12.1%
2
3.0 I 0%
I 95%
139.6%
38
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